recur after any general rule, and thus there would be but confusion, even with a series of uniform sequences, quires adaptation upon adaptation, the adaptation of substance to substance, and of cause to cause, to produce those regular results in which nature abounds, and which, as we shall proceed to show in the next section, are so suited to the constitution of man.

We see how superficial are the views of those who congratulate themselves in the thought, that they have explained any given phenomenon when they have referred It to a law. We had occasion to remark formerly, that, in ascribing an event to a general law, so far from explaining its production, there is only brought under our notice other objects so far resembling it, and equally with it demanding explanation. But we can now go a step farther, and notice how in this general law there must be a number of adjustments implied, additional to those involved in the production of a single effect. When phenomena, falling out according to a law, are brought before us, we have now to determine not only the adjustments which produce the separate events, but also the adjustments which produce them according to a law. In referring a phenomenon to a law, we are multiplying the wonders of nature, in so far as we are bringing into view not only other phenomena which require to be accounted for, but an order among them requiring also to be explained.*

* We see, now, the error of all those who never go beyond laws and developments. M. Comte boasts that he has established a positive philosophy, free from all theory, and seems to think that science can never rise beyond general laws. But positive philosophy tells us that there is never a phenomenon without a cause, never a general phenomenon, or class of phenomena, without a general cause; and it 5s from the adjusted relations of these general causes, that we ascend, by means of the clearest principles of a positive philosophy, to the belief in an Intelligence presiding over the universe. Mr. J. S. Mill acknowledges the existence of causes, but regards them as mere laws of succession, without discovering any potency in

the cause to produce its effect. Hence his error in supposing that there can be no such thing as explanation. (Sec Book in. chap, xii.) We agree with him in thinking that when we refer a phenomenon to a law, we do not explain it, but when we discover a cause we have found an explanation of its occurrence. True, this cause may also have a cause, but as we trace up causca in this way we come at last to a power, which accounts for all causes and effects. We are glad to find Humboldt declaring, (Cosmos, Vol. iii. p. 7, Otto's translation,) that the highest, though more rarely attained aim of all natural inquiry, is the discovery of *earned cmtnesxdon*. It is purely to be regretted that one, who has swept as on angel's wingsa "through physical creation, should not have- delighted to make reference to the Creator, in whom, we happen to know, he firmly believed.